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The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of
Harm in the Endangered Species Act
ROBERT L. FIscHMAN*
INTRODUCTION

In environmental policy, the data gaps between what the law demands and what
science supplies reflect the disparate objectives and epistemological approaches of the
two fields. While existing scholarship has begun illuminating the causes and
consequences of the data gaps, progress in bridging the divide requires a better
understanding of how the gaps differ across the full spectrum of environmental law.
This Article probes the variations in information policy challenges that arise from
different types of environmental law. Scientific information policy serves as a prism
for disaggregating environmental law into component parts.
Whether abating sulfur emissions from power plants, controlling pesticide
exposures to children, administering national parks, or regulating habitat destruction,
all varieties of environmental law illustrate the common problem of enlisting,
integrating, and evaluating science to serve social goals. Despite the disciplinary gulfs
that separate, for instance, public land administrators from toxic tort lawyers, all
environmental law participants suffer from the disconnects between science and law.
All of the programs within environmental law illustrate the two overwhelmingly
important themes of the data gap literature. First, the world (including our bodies) is a
tremendously complex system that defies comprehension in a proximate cause-andeffect framework. Our best current guesses about how human activities translate into
environmental impacts are nearly swamped by the pervasive uncertainties and
simplifying assumptions of applied science. Second, the reality of policy
implementation presents the challenge of funding research to improve understanding of
the environment. Spending on applied science to answer the policy questions posed by
law is such a tiny fraction of what would be needed for good approximations that many
of the debates about information policy are of only marginal practical significance.
However, the particular problems that arise from data gaps do differ along lines that
parallel some of the common distinctions in environmental law. For instance, the
reductionist, controlled experiments of chemistry and toxicology provide a different set
of challenges for integrating information into law than do the ecological issues
associated with conservation biology. And it isn't just the nature of the science that is
important. The proprietary tasks of administering a public land system to achieve
certain statutory goals demand different kinds of information from science than do the
regulatory tasks of protecting the public from pollutant-induced health effects. The
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Endangered Species Act' does not fit neatly into any of these categories. It is at the
crossroads of many of the divisions of environmental law, and thus it illustrates many
of the information policy problems common to the entire field.
Part I of this Article teases apart the strands of environmental law in an attempt to
distinguish among the different types of data gaps manifest in this symposium. After
discussing the divides of environmental law that persist despite its holistic ambition,
Part I focuses on the subject matters, regulatory approaches, and legislative attributes
that distinguish different types of environmental law programs. Part II then examines
the harm problem in the Endangered Species Act: how courts have addressed the vast
data gaps in resolving cases seeking to enjoin activities that adversely modify habitat.
The intractable problems of proof and causation illustrate common difficulties that
pervade information policy across the divides. The Article concludes with some
general observations about the divides and affinities among environmental law
programs, and their relation to information policy.
Environmental law suffers from a lack of cohesion. For many, including the U.S.
Supreme Court, environmental law is a mere aggregation of statutes, rules, and
programs dealing with pollution and conservation.2 By expanding the taxonomy in
which we can usefully analyze differences in approaches to the field, we can
synthesize a more coherent understanding of environmental law in all its dazzling,
infuriating variations.
I. THE

DIVIDES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

For many years, scholars have described the attributes common to environmental
law problems. Professor Lazarus captures most of the distinguishing features of
environmental law in his characterization of environmental injury as the central
concept in the field: "irreversible, catastrophic, and continuing injury"; "physically
distant injury"; "temporally distant injury"; "uncertainty and risk"; "multiple causes";
and "non-economic, nonhuman concerns." 3 Professor Latin highlights many of the
same points in five fundamental dilemmas faced by environmental law: multiplicity of
legally protected interests; pervasive complexity and uncertainty; inappropriate
political and temporal boundaries; transition from perceived abundance to perceived
scarcity; and reversing prodevelopment policies embedded in legal doctrines.4 While
attempts to specify what is distinctive about environmental law are important, they do
not offer much help in understanding the internal organization of the field.
In this Part, I take a different approach to expounding environmental law. I explore
what attributes distinguish the two main lines of environmental lawfrom each other,
rather than from law that is not "environmental." I concern myself exclusively with the
distinctions within environmental law to devise a taxonomy to explore often-obscured
features of the field.

1. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
2. See Richard J.Lazarus, Restoring What'sEnvironmentalAbout EnvironmentalLaw in
the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703, 703 (2000).
3. Id. at 744-48.

4. Howard Latin, Fundamental Dilemmas of Environmental Law (Nov. 5, 2001)
(unpublished thematic essay, on file with the IndianaLaw Journal).
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John Muir, one of the principal founders of the environmental movement, famously
observed that "[w]hen we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to
everything else in the universe." 5 Thus, some of the adjectives commonly describing
the aims of environmental law are: holistic,6 integrated,7 and interconnected.8
However, like many aspirational goals of environmental law, these expressions of
seamless coverage do not accurately describe the practice. As implemented,
environmental law suffers from discontinuities and incompatibilities.
Though there are many advantages to the holistic view, we divide environmental
law into a number of pigeon holes. The most fundamental dichotomy in environmental
law separates pollution control from resource management. 9 Put simply, pollution
control addresses use of the environment as a sink to control disposal of bads.
Resource management addresses the use of the environment as a source of goods.
Pollution control concerns itself primarily with limitations on activities that create
incidental contamination. Resource management concerns itself primarily with direct
allocation of goods. Another way of understanding this dichotomy is that pollution
control seeks to prevent harms, while resource management seeks to allocate benefits.
Often, resource management is implemented through property rights, while pollution
control almost always involves regulation or tort liability. Although a less reliable
guide, pollution control is more preoccupied with human health concerns, resource
management with ecological health.

5. JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 110 (1990). Indeed, one of the leading
environmental law casebooks begins with an authors' preface quoting this famous Muir phrase.
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H. ABRAMS, WILLIAM GOLDFARB & ROBERT L. GRAHAM,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY xxxi (2d ed. 1998).

6. Peter J.Fontaine, EPA's MultimediaEnforcement Strategy: The Struggle to Close the
Environmental Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J.ENVTL. L. 31, 100 (1993); Lakshman
Guruswamy, IntegratingThoughtways: Re-opening of the EnvironmentalMind?, 1989 Wis. L.
REv. 463, 480 (1989); Douglas R. Porter, Reinventing Growth Management for the 21st
Century, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 705, 737 (1999); Jonathan B. Wiener,
Something Borrowedfor Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global
EnvironmentalLaw, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295, 1317 (2001).
7. U.S. EPA Sci. ADVISORY BD., REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1 (1990); Terry W. Frazier, The Green Alternative to Classical
Liberal Property Theory, 20 VT. L. REv. 299, 341 (1995); John R. Nolon, Summary of the
United States Seminar on Our NationalEnvironmentalLaws, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 567, 569

(1996); see also Frances H. Irwin, An Integrated Frameworkfor PreventingPollution and
Protectingthe Environment, 22 ENVTL. L. 1 (1991) (arguing that an integrated framework

should be utilized to solve environmental issues).
8. Joseph A. Hoffman, Negotiating Settlements at New Jersey's ContaminatedSites:
Navigatingan UncharteredSea, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 988, 988 (1991); see also Robert L.
Glicksman, Pollutionon the FederalLands I: Air PollutionLaw, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. POL'Y 1,5

(1993).
9. Robert L. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detailin NationalParkEstablishment
Legislation and Its Relationship to Pollution Control Law, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 779, 784-85
(1997); Glicksman, supra note 8, at 1-5; Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the
Implementationof FederalEnvironmentalLaw, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311,317-18. See

generally Robert L. Fischman, What Is Natural Resources Law?, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 717
(2007).
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Dividing environmental law into its two subject-matter strands may hinder
integrated understanding and resolution of environmental problems. It is frequently
difficult or impossible to achieve the aims of resource management without addressing
pollution problems. For instance, the maintenance of healthy populations of animals in
Chesapeake Bay, including sustainable populations of commercial shellfish, requires
the control of sources of pollution.' 0 Similarly, maintaining viable populations of
wildlife essential to a national park may require restrictions on air emissions.
Atmospheric deposition of mercury, for example, interferes with the reproductive
success of Florida panthers in Everglades National Park. "1For aquatic animals, such as
amphibians and fish, pollution is the second most common cause of listing under the
2
Endangered Species Act, after habitat loss. 1
Conversely, pollution goals are often dependent on good resource management. The
attainment of water quality standards in Chesapeake Bay requires controlling the
harvest of and maintaining the habitat for oysters, which feed by filtering (and thus
cleaning) the water.13 In many places, attaining water quality standards requires
restrictions on logging in the watershed as well as the application of best technology to
dischargers along the river. 14
Unfortunately, our cognitive limitations inhibit us from grasping completely the
seamless whole of environmental law, in its unity and "one-ness." Charles Lindblom
long ago recognized that attempts to manage programs with comprehensive rationality

10. On "integrated, holistic" management of the Chesapeake Bay, see Jon Cannon, Choices
andInstitutionsin WatershedManagement,25 WM. &MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 379, 380,
387 (2000). More generally, Bamett M. Lawrence persuasively argues that "national coastal
policy, however, requires greater coordination of pollution control efforts with land use
management and preservation programs." Barnett M. Lawrence, Towards a National Coastal
Policy, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,404, 10,411 (1987).
11. C. Facemire, T. Augspurger, D. Bateman, M. Brim, P. Conzelmann, S. Delchamps, E.
Douglas, L. Inmon, K. Looney, F. Lopez, G. Masson, D. Morrison, N. Morse & A. Robison,
Impacts of Mercury Contaminationin the Southeastern United States, 80 WATER AIR & SOIL
POLLUTION 923,925-26 (1995). For other examples of pollution problems faced by public land
managers, see Glicksman, supra note 8, at 5-6.
12. David S. Wilcove, David Rothstein, Jason Dubow, Ali Phillips & Elizabeth Losos,
Quantifying Threats to ImperiledSpecies in the UnitedStates, 48 BIoScIENCE 607, 609 (1998).
13. TOM HORTON & WILLIAM M. EICHBAUM, TURNING THE TIDE: SAVING THE CHESAPEAKE
BAY 174-78 (1991); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, DEVELOPMENT OF A SUSPENSION FEEDING
AND DEPOSIT FEEDING BENTHOs MODEL FOR THE CHESAPEAKE BAY 3-1 (2000), available at
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/subcommittee/mdsc/hqi-benthos-model.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that the
Garcia River water quality standard was not attained because of sedimentation from logging).
Siltation is the leading cause of impairment of rivers and streams in the United States. U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE QUALITY OF OUR NATION'S WATER 11 (1992), available at
http://www.epa.gov/305b/92report/92summ.pdf. In its 1992 inventory, the EPA attributed
impairment through silviculture as the source of 7 percent, and resource extraction as the source
of I1 percent, of the assessed river miles impaired by pollution. Id. at 12. Prescribed burning for
agriculture and silviculture contributes to air pollution problems in many parts of the country.
JANICE PETERSON & DAROLD WARD, AN INVENTORY OF PARTICULATE MATT'ER AND AIR Toxic
EMISSIONS FROM PRESCRIBED FIRES IN THE UNITED STATES FOR 1989 (USDA Forest Service
Pacific Northwest Research Station).
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generally fail. 15 We have little choice but to fragment environmental law into
manageable pieces. While holism is an attractive philosophy, solving real-world
problems requires discrete actions. Implementation of environmental law-the
translation of goals into behavioral constraints on human behavior-demands
specialized information in such divergent areas as industrial engineering and aquatic
ecology. It also requires a diverse array of administrative tools and decisional
standards.
To understand and improve the complex landscape of environmental law (the
"field"), we need a vocabulary to describe and classify its features. The great cleft
separating pollution control and resource management is evident in the way law
professors divide their curriculums and organize themselves through the Association of
American Law Schools (AALS) sections.' 6 Though there is some overlap, the
practices in the two areas remain distinct and most attorneys who specialize in one
typically do not practice in the other. In the main, the EPA implements the pollution
control statutes while the resource management statutes distribute implementation to a
variety of cabinet departments, principally the Department of the Interior, the
Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Commerce.
Distinguishing environmental law by the subject matter it addresses is helpful and
serves as a surrogate for other important stylistic characteristics. Most important for
this symposium is that the divide in subject matter often corresponds to a divide in the
most relevant scientific discipline. But, it is only one of three dimensions along which
we can characterize the divide in environmental law. To think of environmental law
solely along the lines of pollution control versus resource management oversimplifies a
more nuanced field and overlooks important lessons. In addition to the subject matter,
the divide in environmental law also plays out in regulatory approaches and statutory
(detail versus discretion) attributes.
Over all three dimensions, the divides slow the diffusion of good ideas and the
revision ofpoor choices. Actual integration of environmental law presents serious risks
of conceptual hubris, catastrophic tfailure, and political capture.' 7 However, greater
cross-fertilization would invigorate each subfield with fresh ideas and perspectives.'S
Each of the strands of environmental law can learn from the other to avoid unnecessary
re-invention of approaches to problems seemingly unique to the sub-specialty but
really part of a common, cross-cutting attribute of environmental law. Crossfertilization and hybridization can help apply the lessons from one category of
environmental law across the divide to improve information policy on the other side.

15. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through ", 19 Put. ADMW. REV. 79,
79-80 (1959); Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PuB. ADMIN. REV.
517, 518 (1979).

16. The term "environmental law" is often used to refer solely to the pollution control side
of the divide. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ix-x (2d ed. 1994). In
this Article, I use the term in its more comprehensive, inclusive meaning. On course content and
the AALS, see Fischman, What is NaturalResources Law?, supra note 9, at 717, 723-727.
17. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Mark Brownstein, On IntegratedPollution Control, 22
ENvTL. L. 119 (1991) (discussing some of these dangers).
18. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail, supra note 9, at 784-85 (noting that
"fruitful cross-fertilization may result from efforts to reweave" pollution control and resource
management law); David J. Hayes, Cross-Pollination,ENvT,. F., July-Aug. 1998, at 28.
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Though environmental law comes in many forms, statutes are the major currency of
control and commentary. Certainly, the common law of property and torts, which
includes the public trust doctrine, nuisance, and negligence, is important. Regulatory
innovations promulgated by agencies through rulemaking also comprise an important
source of environmental law. However, statutes are the single most important category
and hew to a level of generality that permits comparison and serves as a barometer of
the state of the field. Of course, environmental statutes are not monolithic. Different
parts of the same statute sometimes coexist on different sides of the divide. And,
judicial interpretation of statutes may have as much to say about the attributes of
environmental law as Congress. Part II will focus on the way courts meld common law
with statutes in the context of information policy.
This Part seeks to tease out the dimensions along which environmental law cleaves.
By expanding on the characteristics that separate environmental law programs, I hope
to reveal new features of the terrain. Recognizing the affinities and distinctions can
lead to better innovations that apply the lessons learned from one area of
environmental law to another that might otherwise not seem comparable. However, in
order to categorize the styles of environmental law, generalization is a necessary
hazard. No dichotomy described in this Article is a rule without exception. Indeed,
several exceptions reveal the potential benefits of hybridization. Moreover, recent
trends indicate that the two styles are converging. The better we understand the real,
persistent divide in environmental law, the brighter our prospects will be for effective
reform.
A. Subject Matters: Pollution Control Versus Resource Management
This first, and most fundamental, divide sorts environmental law by subject matter.
The classic pollution control laws concern themselves with abating environmental
contamination. Examples include the Clean Air Act;' 9 the Clean Water Act; 20 the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; 21 the Comprehensive Environmental
22
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; and the Toxic Substances Control Act. 23
The statutes generally focus on regulating the emission, discharge, and disposal of
contaminants that have adverse effects when released into the environment.
The pollution control restrictions on casting off material into the public sink are
oriented toward protecting the public health from harm. Most pollution control
standards are set based on medical rather than ecological considerations. Even when a
pollution control statute such as the Clean Air Act includes a program for establishing
ecological harm prevention standards, it is seldom implemented. While primary air
quality standards are set to protect public health with an "adequate margin of safety,"
secondaryair quality standards for broader environmental and economic objectives are

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

42 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.

9§ 7401-7671q (2000).
§§ 1251-1387 (2000).
§§ 6901-6992k (2000).
§§ 9601-9675 (2000).
§§ 2601-2692 (2000).
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set at whatever level is "requisite to protect public welfare. 24 But, the EPA has set all
but one secondary ambient standard at the same level as the primary standard.25
The classic resource management laws concern themselves with allocating rights of
property use for such purposes as mining (e.g., General Mining Law of 1872,26
Mineral Leasing Act 27), grazing (e.g., Taylor Grazing Act 28), logging (e.g., National
Forest Management Act 29), and recreation (e.g., Federal Land Policy & Management
Act,3 ° Refuge Improvement Act 31 ). These goods, or beneficial uses, are allocated
directly through the law. All of the public land system organic acts are types of
resource management laws. In general, all laws concerning public lands or public
property are a form of resource management law. In addition, laws protecting wildlife
32
and other scarce or highly valued resources, such as the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
the Endangered Species Act, 33 or the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 34 also concern
themselves with allocating the public benefits. The strength of the resource
management law is in programs directly allocating the resource (e.g., setting hunting
seasons) or public works programs to enhance the resource (e.g., constructing fish
hatcheries). Where the resource management programs are called upon to regulate an
activity indirectly using a resource of concern, they are generally less effective (e.g.,
controlling incidental harms to species caused by housing developments).
Another aspect of the subject matter dichotomy in environmental law emerges when
one asks: to what does a program apply? One category of programs applies to things
uniformly across the country. This approach corresponds closely with pollution control
law. Uniform approaches can be by activity, medium, or chemical substance. Some of
these programs apply to a particular activity, such as surface coal mining, or operating
an oil tanker. These laws follow in the tradition of sectoral economic regulation that
has been in the mainstream of modern administrative law from the beginning (with the
establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission) and that grew substantially
during the New Deal. Other statutes concern themselves with a particular medium,
such as air or water. The Toxic Substances Control Act employs the chemical
substance approach to achieve a uniform, national regulatory
system for particularly
35
dangerous substances that have commercial application.
The benefit of an activity focus is that it directly addresses a particular set of actions
that cause a predictable suite of problems for the environment. Because environmental
law is about controlling human behavior with respect to the environment, there is a
logic to organizing its programs around types of activities. Shipping oil in tankers,
after all, raises a recurring and discrete, if complex, set of problems. One prime

24. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2000).
25. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-.12 (2000). Sulfur dioxide is the only ambient air pollutant with a
different secondary standard. Carbon monoxide has a primary but no secondary standard.
26. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (2000).
27. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (2000).
28. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (2000).
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (2000).
30. 43 U.S.C.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

16 U.S.C.
16 U.S.C.
16 U.S.C.
16 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.

§§ 1701-1784 (2000).
§§ 668dd-ee (2000).

§§ 703-712 (2000).

§§ 1531-1543 (2000).
§§ 1271-1287 (2000).
§§ 2601-2692 (2000).
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weakness of activity-based control is that it risks capture if the administering agency is
organized around the industry engaged in the activity. Another problem is that the
central focus of these programs may miss the mark of maintaining the health of the
environment. Without performance goals or ambient measures, activity-based laws can
drift away from the ultimate goals of environmental quality.
Media-based laws are best represented by the classic pollution control trio: the
Clean Water Act, 36 Clean Air Act, 37 and Solid Waste Disposal Act. 38 Each of these
laws seeks to integrate a wide variety of activity controls around a core concern to
maintain clean and healthful water, air, and land, respectively. The water and air media
are the most comprehensively covered by federal programs. Federal land protection
law is limited to abating only the most egregious insults to land health. One might even
categorize the ESA as a medium-based statute because of its focus on the full range of
activities that impinge on species viability, or the resource of species diversity, without
regard to geographic location. Species viability may serve as a rough surrogate for
biosphere health.
Media-based laws penetrate deeply into our core objective in environmental law.
The quality of air, water, and land, and the viability of species, provide good bottom
lines for evaluating effectiveness. These programs may tailor controls to the particular
properties of different media. For instance, water tends to move in more predictable
ways than air. Local air quality tends to rebound after severe pollution episodes, but
species often fail to recover after severe depopulation.
Nonetheless, reaction against the media ghettos of environmental law stresses the
shell game that shuffles problems, such as toxic contaminants, from one medium to
another. And, the media are not as distinct as they may appear at first blush. Much
pollution in large bodies of water, such as Lake Superior and the Chesapeake Bay, is
deposited from polluted air. 9Water pollution contributes to biodiversity loss in many
areas of the country. For instance, diminishing populations of large fish in the
Adirondacks and the Poconos-Catskills have been attributed to widespread, pollutioninduced losses of mollusks, leeches, insects, algae, crustaceans, and cyprinid fish.40
Various species of birds have similarly declined due to the cascading effects of
environmental degradation from pollution.'
One response to the media shell game is multi-media permitting. This cross-media
approach works because key programs divide regulations by activity. For instance, the
Clean Water Act, though a medium-based statute, operates primarily through
technology-based effluent limitations derived from individual categories of industrial

36. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
39. U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, DEPOSITION OF AIR POLLUTANTS TO THE GREAT WATERS:
THIRD REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/gr8water/

3rdrpt/execsum.html.
40. D.W. Schindler, Biotic Impoverishment at Home and Abroad, 39 BIOSCIENCE 426
(1989). Other studies have blamed the decrease in sunfish and small mouth bass populations on
the destruction of food chains by airborne acid deposition. D.W. Schindler, Effects ofAcid Rain
on FreshwaterEcosystems, 239 SCIENCE 149, 154 n.43 (1988).

41. Jon R. Luoma, Black DuckDecline:An AcidRain Link, AUDUBON, May 1987, at 19,22
(citing studies showing that acidification's impacts on the food chain account for a sixty percent
decrease in the growth rate of young ducks).
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activities.42 The over five hundred categories of technology standards represent a
nationally uniform approach to regulating particular activities.
Place-based environmental laws depart from the three uniform types of subject
focus in that they are tailored to particular locales. In general, place-based
environmental law corresponds to the resource management branch. Natural resources
law is more concerned with the special than the ordinary. 43 The paradigmatic placebased statutes are the public land organic acts that require unit-level planning. The idea
behind planning, which originated with the agencies themselves, is to translate general
principles into timelines for actions and zones of use. In 1976, the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act (FLPMA) and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA)
required unit-level plans of the multiple-use, sustained-yield federal public lands. 44
Other planning mandates followed. 45 Location-specific plans are also central to other
public resource management laws. For instance, development and approval ofplans for
leased oil, or plans of operation for hardrock mining, are pivotal for applying national
standards to particular projects.46
Other resource management statutes, such as the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), also require plans that
place broader goals into the context of a specific area.47 The CZMA is concerned with
a number of issues, including the control of nonpoint sources of water, in the coastal
regions of the country. It would be a stretch to classify the coast as a medium, though.
The CZMA does require individual state plans, which must address a number of
development and water quality issues. The states tailor these plans to the particular
circumstances of their coasts. From that perspective, the CZMA fits most comfortably
in the place-based comer. Though programmatic environmental impact statements
(EISs) may address proposed federal actions that are not tied to a specific location,
most NEPA environmental impact analyses address the site-specific effects of
particular projects.48
The trend toward ecosystem management is, in part, an effort to make
environmental law more location specific. From public land management to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act's
(CERCLA's) remediation of Superfund sites, place-based programs have experienced
a surge in interest because they focus on the actual, on-the-ground (or on-the-water)
needs of a particular community of living things. Both the EPA, through its "placebased" initiative, 49 and the resource agencies, through "ecosystem management"

42. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314(b) (2000).
43. Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary,38 IDAHO L.
REv. 325, 325-27 (2002); Fischman, What Is NaturalResouces Law?, supra note 9, at 717.
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000) (NFMA); 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2000) (FLPMA).
45. 16 U.S.C. §§ la-7 (2000) (national park plans); 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2000) (national
wildlife refuge plans).
46. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 3809 (2000).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (2000) (CZMA); 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000) (NEPA).
48. See, e.g., EXECUTvE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALITY, THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE

YEARS 11 (1997); THE NEPA TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY: MODERNIZING NEPA IMPLEMENTATION 35-43 (2003).
49. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECOSYSTEM PROTECTION WORKGROUP, TOWARD A
PLACE-DRIVEN APPROACH: THE EDGEWATER CONSENSUS ON AN

EPA STRATEGY FOR ECOSYSTEM
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policies, 50 have declared their allegiance to this ecological world view. Whether for the
long-term restoration of ecological integrity, for the sustainable flows of renewable
resources, or for the provision of nature's services, ecosystem management focuses the
law on the actual operation of nature, in all its biodiversity. 51
Certainly, the appeal of fine-tuning the application of national goals to the
individual circumstances of watersheds, basins, regions, neighborhoods, and biomes,
has a strong basis in science. However, the place-based program risks instigating a race
to the bottom, as national standards recede. Tailoring through public participation
invites local preferences to have greater sway over final decisions. Many
environmental groups fear capture of local processes by developmental interests.
Environmental groups simply do not have the resources to participate in every sitespecific debate over development, clean-up, or restoration. Short-staffed organizations
do better leveraging their resources through rulemakings establishing nationally
applicable substantive standards. This is one reason why so many environmental
groups opposed the Quincy Library Project, a place-based, multi-stakeholder
collaboration on national forest management in a region of the Sierra Nevada.5 2 The
resource management laws have struggled for years to strike an appropriate balance
between national or regional guidelines and location-specific projects and plans. Under
the Clean Air Act, the individual state implementation plans (SIPs) are place-based
applications of national medium-specific goals. But, the Clean Air Act also has its fair
share of activity-specific technology-based standards. Indeed, the ambient
environmental tailoring of SIPs and water quality standards are the weaker siblings to
the technology-based effluent limitations in pollution control law.
B. Regulatory Approaches: CategoricalVersus Utilitarian
An important ongoing debate in the pollution control area concerns the choice
between categorical and utilitarian approaches to promote environmental quality.
Categorical approaches in environmental law limit uses based on their attributes as
environmentally disfavored behavior. These are the "bads" we seek to avoid,
minimize, and mitigate. In environmental law, we often make broad judgments about
actions such as road-building, hunting, or emitting pollution, without regard to the
actual consequences of the particular application. In contrast, utilitarian approaches are
less concerned with the nature of the activity itself and more concerned with the effects
produced by the activity, such as risks of cancer, death, eutrophication, or extinction.
Even where environmental law fails to measure and balance all the relevant costs and
benefits of an action, it may nonetheless take a utilitarian posture if it focuses on
outcome over behavior.
A more moderate way to understand this dichotomy is to view categorical
approaches as hazard-avoiding techniques. 53 Once we identify that an activity (or
15, 1994 draft).
50. See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISH AND
WILDLIFE CONSERVATION (1995); U.S. FOREST SERV., A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK: ECOSYSTEM
PROTECTION (March

MANAGEMENT (1994).

51. See R. Edward Grumbine, What is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 27, 31 (1994).
52. ROBERT B. KErTER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATuRE 274-99 (2003).
53. See John S. Applegate, Introduction to 1ENVIRONMENTAL RISK (John S. Applegate ed.,
2004).
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pollutant) can cause a hazard we wish to avoid, then we take the precaution of banning
or minimizing most occurrences. At the very least, we shift the burden of proof to the
promoter of the activity to show lack of potential harm. In contrast, the utilitarian
approach seeks to balance risk to optimize our policy choices. It requires more
information to implement because it demands proportionate controls, limits, or
encouragement of activities to balance the probable costs with the benefits.
Professor Mark Sagoff has contrasted these two approaches philosophically. He
describes utilitarian decision making as relying on the cumulative preferences of
individuals. The right utilitarian decision maximizes the satisfaction of preferences.
Categorical decision making is "judged on the basis of reasons rather than wants." This
view maintains "a notion of the common good as an object posited and understood by
reason;" this is different from54thinking of the public interest as a matter to be measured
in terms of subjective wants.
The dichotomy between the two approaches may be traced to the historical origins
of much of natural resources law in Progressive Era utilitarianism. The professionalexpert, economic decision-making model that went along with this movement accounts
for much of the content of natural resources law before 1960. Professionals and experts
are the ones trained in the science of ascertaining and cumulating preferences and risks
in a utilitarian approach." In contrast, laws that grew out of the grassroots social
movements of the 1960s have a stronger flavor of the categorical judgments of
romanticism and populism. Though we associate this historical movement with the rise
of federal pollution control statutes, some resource management laws, such as the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act and the Wilderness Act, can fairly be classified as clustering
along the categorical pole at least in part due to their historical origins. 56 Stephen Fox
has persuasively argued that the divide in environmental policy in the United States is
characterized by the gulf between professional modes of decision making and
generalist (amateur) grassroots activism. 57 This, more than the common conservationist
versus preservationist distinction, accurately reflects the origins of the categoricalutilitarian dichotomy.
Many statutes employ both the categorical and the utilitarian approaches. The key
practical question in environmental law is what balance to strike between the two in
order to achieve a fair and effective program. Consider the Clean Water Act (CWA).
Parts of the CWA carry on the utilitarian tradition of pollution control by limiting
discharges only to the extent that they impair beneficial uses of water. The "fishableswimable" water quality goal of the statute neatly summarizes the utilitarian facet of
the CWA. 58 Operationally, the establishment of water quality standards provides the
touchstone for evaluating whether discharges need to be abated. The utilitarian
approach applies controls only to the extent that discharges frustrate the attainment of
water quality standards.

54.

MARK

SAGOFF,

THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE

43-46 (1988).
55. Id. at 47.
56. See, e.g., STEPHEN Fox, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 289 (1981).
57. See STEPHEN Fox, JOHN MUIR AND His LEGACY: THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION
MOVEMENT (2d prtg. 1981).
ENVIRONMENT

58. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
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Nonetheless, like most pollution control statutes, the dominant approach of the
CWA is categorical, limiting actions that are deemed "bad" types of behavior. The
historical precedent for this facet of the CWA is the 1899 "Refuse Act" (section 13 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act) that prohibited the discharge of "any refuse matter of any
kind" that may impede navigation. 59 Its modem guise is the CWA permit requirements
that point-source dischargers employ various versions of best-available technology to
abate pollution. The technology-based effluent limitations are a form of categorical
mandate requiring people to minimize their environmentally bad activities, regardless
of the specific effects manifested.
The conflict over these two approaches in pollution control law is robust and
longstanding. Professor Rodgers writes that the two approaches disagree on economic
and environmental policy. The approaches disagree about whether pollution is just a
negative externality or if a greater moral obligation exists, and how to effect
60
environmental reform (e.g., through market incentives or command and controls).
However, the resource management strand of environmental law has taken little notice
of these arguments despite the presence of very similar choices in that subfield.
The public land and resource management statutes also rely on categorical
approaches by specifying prohibited, subservient, multiple, dominant, or primary uses.
In tension with these approaches are utilitarian baselines that place the burden ofproof
on an agency seeking to impose restrictions or limitations on use. Consider the balance
between categorical and utilitarian approaches in the NFMA. Like most resource
management statutes, the NFMA places utilitarian limits on uses of federal land. So,
for instance, timber harvests must meet a number of requirements to ensure that their
effects are not too severe. These requirements include encouragement of plant and
animal diversity, 61 ensuring that lands can be restocked within five years, 62 and
preventing irreversible damage to soils. 63 Coexisting with this, though, is the
categorical approach, which overlays much national forest decision making. Forest
Service planning must be consistent with the congressional policy that designates
national forests for "outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish
purposes." 64 More specifically, the NFMA generally prohibits timber harvesting that

59. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000). This belies the general historical rule that associates utilitarian
approaches with the Progressive Era. Another version of the two views is described by Professor
Sax as the transformative (utilitarian) economy versus the (categorical) economy of nature.
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1442-46 (1993).
60. RODGERS, supra note 16, at 259.
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2000). This is the provision on which the Forest Service
based its famous 1982-2001 management requirement to ensure the maintenance of minimum
viable populations of most vertebrate species. That regulation proved to be the single most
important factor in the judicial suspension of old-growth logging in the Pacific Northwest.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(ii) (2000).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(i) (2000).
64. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) (2000) (incorporating
the multiple use and sustained yield of the products and services obtained from the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2000)).
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deviates from the principle ofnondeclining even flow 6566or that takes trees that have not
reached their culmination of mean annual increment.
Much turns on the relative weight given to the two approaches. For instance, in
debating the proposed legislation for management of the National Wildlife Refuge
System, Congress had to decide whether to adopt a categorical approach and outright
ban all recreational uses not dependent on wildlife or instead permit the low-priority
uses, conditioned upon a non-degradation performance standard. Ultimately, Congress
enacted the latter approach in its 1997 Refuge Improvement Act.67 Therefore, rather
than categorically banning jet-skiing from the refuges, Congress permitted the activity
as long as, in its particular application, it is compatible with the refuge purposes and
does not68prevent the attainment of "biological integrity, diversity, and environmental
health.",
As with most distinctions in environmental law, the disparity between utilitarian
and categorical approaches dissolves at the margins when we look at particular
applications more closely. This is because most environmental programs soften both
approaches, employing hybrids based on one approach, while moderating by reference
to the other. For instance, several technology-based pollution abatement programs,
such as the regulation of thermal discharges under the CWA, allow waivers or
variances from the categorical imperative of minimization where the polluter can show
the absence of harm to the environment.69 Similarly, national forest timber
management may deviate from the nondeclining even flow or the culmination of mean
annual increment categorical requirements when faced with the need to salvage
diseased or burned trees.
While the categorical approach in environmental law generally specifies classes of
disapproved activities, the natural resources strand illustrates that it can be used to
single out particular classes of activities to be encouraged. The Refuge Improvement
Act establishes a class of preferred activities when it gives preference to wildlifedependent recreation. 70 This is characteristic of "dominant use regimes." Other
statutes, such as the 1872 general mining law, employ a categorical approach to make
basic policy without looking to the particular effects of an activity in place. 71 The
mining law favors hard rock mineral extraction even where the environmental costs
outweigh the benefits or where alternative uses of land would generate greater
benefits.72
The categorical approach of the mining law is related to its adoption of property
rights to allocate the goods. In general, property law (like natural resources law) is
strongly tied to the categorical, rather than the utilitarian approach. In addition to the

65. 16 U.S.C. § 1611 (2000).
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(m) (2000).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d) (2000).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(3)(A)(i), (a)(4)(B) (2000).
69. Clean Water Act, ch. 758, § 316, 86 Stat. 876 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1326
(2000)); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985); Seacoast AntiPollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 874-75 (1st Cir. 1978).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(2) (2000); see also Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife
Refuge System and the Hallmarks ofModern Organic Legislation,29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457,52638 (2002).
71. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (2000).
72. See, e.g., In re Pac. Coast Molybdenum Co., 90 Interior Decisions 352 (1983).
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historical explanations for this, commentators have also justified property law's brightline drawing of the numerus clausus principle as reducing the information burden on
the large numbers of people who must be able to recognize property types in order to
understand their rights and obligations. 7 Professors Merrill and Smith explain that this
limitation on tailoring property types is "a deep design principle." Though Merrill and
Smith are interested primarily in private property, the design principle is manifest in
natural resources law that governs public property as well. It favors clearly bounded
categorical tools over utilitarian approaches.
Professor Houck has persuasively argued that the evolution of pollution control law
has been toward more effective categorical, technology-based standards (what he calls
"alternatives") and away from ambient, risk-balancing standards.74 Problems with data
gaps largely drove this historic shift. Emerging from the common law burdens of
proving causation and harm, and the early federal efforts at promoting ambient-based
regulation of water pollution, the 1972 Clean Water Act shifted strategies and
effectively employed the categorical approach of minimizing discharge. 75 The Clean
Air Act's adoption of a categorical strategy as central to the program came later, but
was largely cinched by the 1990 Amendments. 76
In recent years, however, both pollution control and resource management law have
experienced a renaissance of interest in utilitarian approaches. The total maximum
daily load (TMDL) program is probably the most important new water pollution
control development of the past decade. It revisits the ambient water quality standards
provisions of the CWA and seeks to translate those goals into allocations of pollutants
for individual bodies of water. 7 Similarly, ecosystem management in natural resources
law has emerged as a cutting-edge development that seeks to control activities based
on their impacts on various indicia of ecosystem health and integrity, such as species
populations, forest vitality, and habitat quality.
It will be important in exploring the new utilitarianism, or risk-balancing, revival in
environmental law to maintain a sound balance between the two approaches. Because
utilitarian risk-balancing is so information demanding, we often cannot conclusively
show where the balance falls. Therefore, burdens of proof often become the
determinative, de facto decision makers. If an environmental program has a default
mode allowing an activity to go forward unless shown to trigger a utilitarian-based
control, then most activities will go forward for lack of proof. Cumulatively, this can

73. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property?, 111 YALE L.J.
357, 359 (2001) ("[Plroperty is required to come in standardized packages that the layperson
can understand at low cost."); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1
(2000) (analyzing the theoretical and practical features of the numerus clausus).The categorical
thrust of property law may also be articulated as a preference for rules over standards. Kathleen
M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 51-55 (1992).
74. Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds, and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of
EnvironmentalLaw, 63 Miss. L.J. 403,407 (1994); see also Adam Babich, Too Much Science
in EnvironmentalLaw, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119 (2003) (discussing the difference between
technology-based and risk-based environmental standards).
75. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 1314(b) (2000).
76. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411-12 (2000).
77. 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 1(m), 1313(d) (2000).
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cause piecemeal degradation. Certainly, it fails to institutionalize caution 78 or to meet
the precautionary principle. 7 9 On the other hand, environmental law, through
prohibitions, sometimes reverses the usual common law, liberal presumption that
allows an activity to go forward unless it is shown to be harmful.
In describing his superb book, The Control of Nature, John McPhee explains that
his title phrase came from a limestone etching on the engineering building at the
University of Wyoming. McPhee noted the bilateral ambiguity of the phrase that
"could with equal speed travel in opposite directions." 80 In environmental law, the
phrase "to permit activities" carries a similarly delicious irony. One reading of the
phrase is to allow activities. However, the phrase also means to regulate activities
through government issued licenses. In this Part, I use the phrase in its second sense.
Pollution control law has routinely employed prohibitions as a basis for shifting the
burden to potential emitters, disposers, or dischargers to come to the government to get
a permit in order to proceed with a desired activity. With a few exceptions for phaseouts of egregiously risky things, such as lead in gasoline, DDT applications, and open
dumps, prohibitions in pollution control law seldom actually ban activities. Instead, the
permit programs allow otherwise prohibited activities to proceed in accordance with
restrictions written into the permit or license. Permits are the critical link between
general regulations and the specific circumstance of particular activities in a certain
location. Prohibitions shift the burden to the permittee.
Although natural resource law has had some permit programs for quite some time,
such as those for grazing on public lands, they have played a less important role.
Compared to pollution control, resource management prohibitions often do operate to
ban activities. For instance, roads may not be constructed in areas designated
"wilderness areas" under the Wilderness Act of 1964,81 and coal deposits on
"unsuitable" land may not be mined. 82 Prohibitions in this way are used as a basis for
rare categorical disapproval of types of activities.
By focusing on the categorical-utilitarian dimension of environmental law, we can
see a different pattern of variation from the pollution control-versus-resource
management distinction. On the categorical-utilitarian continuum, the ESA permit
program has more in common with the CWA permit program than with the Wilderness
Act or even other wildlife protection statutes, such as the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.
Similarly, the Refuge Improvement Act scheme of dominant use has as much in
common with technology-based limitations than with the NFMA management criteria.
This shift in perspective becomes important for considering a response to the judicial
difficulties in establishing a standard of proof for private ESA liability, explored in
Part II.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
Applegate, supra note 53, at xii-xxi.
JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE, at back cover (1989).
Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000).
30 U.S.C. § 1272 (2000).
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C. LegislativeAttributes: Detail Versus Discretion
1. Statutory Detail vs. Agency Latitude
All environmental programs vary in the degree of detail that Congress provides to
guide and bind implementing agencies. However, many programs do cluster at the
ends of the continuum and create a dichotomy between statutory detail (where
Congress is quite specific and therefore restrictive) and agency latitude (where
Congress is quite permissive). Pollution control legislation correlates to the detail pole,
while resource management law tends toward agency latitude.
The two classic examples of statutory detail come from pollution control law: the
1984 Amendments to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act. In both cases, statutory detail arose from distrust
between Congress and the administration. Congress enacted the more striking of the
two examples, the 1984 RCRA Amendments, in the wake of scandals at the EPA
involving administration of programs relating to hazardous waste site clean-ups.
Because RCRA deals with the prevention of future hazardous waste sites, Congress
feared that the Reagan administration would not adequately implement legislation
written with a broad brush. In particular, Congress feared that the Reagan
administration would continue the tradition, which predated his election, of issuing
pollution-controlling regulations well after the deadline Congress established for the
EPA. By 1984, Congress had placed hundreds of deadlines on the EPA for
implementation of environmental programs. The agency missed most of these
deadlines. 83
The 1984 RCRA Amendments limited EPA discretion through statutory detail
principally by enacting "hammers" that establish concrete consequences for
noncompliance.84 A hammer provision operates by providing a draconian (prohibitive)
rule that will take effect on a particular date unless the agency has promulgated a
substitute regulation. For instance, the RCRA Amendments would have virtually
banned the land disposal of any hazardous waste for which the EPA had not
promulgated a treatment standard by specified dates.8 5 A hammer provision creates
incentives for regulated entities to promote compromise to ensure swift agency action
rather than delay. The hammer provisions of RCRA were entirely successful in
86
spurring the EPA to meet the deadlines for promulgating treatment standards.
Surprisingly, a precedent for the RCRA hammer provisions can be found across the
subject matter divide, in the 1962 Refuge Recreation Act. This statute established a
default prohibition on recreational uses of refuges until the Secretary of the Interior
determined that funds were available for the development, operation, and maintenance

83. Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 326-27 (1991). Lazarus generally

ascribes congressional distrust to the "seemingly never-ending onslaught of impossible agency
tasks" from Congress as well as administration-created implementation problems and
institutional limitations. Id.
84. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (2000).
85. Id.
86. ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, MAXINE I. LIPELES & MARK S. SQUILLACE, AN ENviRoNmENTAL
LAW ANTHOLOGY 131 (1996).
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of a particular form of proposed recreation. 87 Conditioning recreational use on
adequate funding was a clever way to create a constituency for operational
appropriations, which often take a back seat to the more glamorous monies for new
acquisitions and facilities. A group wishing to open up a refuge to a certain type of
recreation, for example, snowmobiling, would have to lobby Congress to appropriate
funds for the attendant administrative costs. Conditioning recreation on an
administrative finding of adequate funds also gave the Fish & Wildlife Service,
generally a timid agency, a statutory scapegoat to better justify administratively
sensible, but unpopular, decisions.88 Moreover, it relieved some of the pressure on the
agency to divert funds from conservation to recreation. 89 The fiscal criterion in the
Recreation Act is an overlooked antecedent tool for shifting the political dynamic of
interest group lobbying (whether generators of hazardous waste regulated under RCRA
or snowmobilers seeking to ride in refuges) from avoidance, delay, and budgetary
austerity, to prompt appropriation of the necessary funds to make and implement
determinations. 90
In some instances, Congress goes beyond time frames and specifies in detail which
substances the EPA should regulate. This is what Professors Shapiro and Glicksman
label restriction of regulatory discretion. 91 While Congress determines for the agency
whether to regulate certain pollutants, it gives the agency discretion over how to
regulate the pollutants. For instance, in the 1984 RCRA amendments, Congress
specified particular solvents, dioxins, and "California-list" wastes for which the EPA
had to establish treatment standards by certain dates. 92 The EPA, though, retained a
great deal of control over the process for setting the treatment standards themselves.
Similarly, the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments listed 189 hazardous air pollutants for
the EPA to establish emission standards. 93 Before Congress established the list of
air
pollutants, the EPA had promulgated emission standards for only six hazardous
94
pollutants since Congress first authorized it to regulate these contaminants.

87. 1962 Refuge Recreation Act, Pub. L. No. 87-714, § 1, 76 Stat. 653 (1962).
88. See STEVEN L. YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY 149-50 (1982) (providing an excellent
description of the way the Fish & Wildlife Service, in its regulatory capacity, favored clear,
prohibitive guidelines because they give unambiguous direction and allow the Fish & Wildlife
Service to deflect criticism by maintaining that its hands are tied by a statute).
89. The legislative history of the Recreation Act indicates that Fish and Wildlife Services
had been diverting funds in this manner. S. REP. No. 87-1858 (1962), as reprinted in 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2725-26 (report of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior); see also Richard
J.Fink, The National Wildlife Refuges: Theory, Practice,and Prospect, 18 HARv. ENvTL. L.
REV. 1, 28 (1994).
90. Inadequate funding for the full range of determinations under the Endangered Species
Act is a particularly acute implementation constraint today. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho,
Can RegulationEvolve? Lessons From a Study in MaladaptiveManagement,55 UCLA L. REV.
293,348 (2007); Robert L. Fischman, PredictionsandPrescriptionsfor the EndangeredSpecies
Act, 34 ENvTL. L. 451, 471-75 (2004).
91. Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet
Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DuKE L.J. 819, 822 (1988).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(e)-(f) (2000). "California-list" wastes were regulated at the time
under a California state land disposal program. Id.
93. Clean Air Act of 1990 § 112(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2000). The EPA can modify or
accept petitions to modify the list. Id.
94. RODGERS, supra note 16, at 135-37.
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In other instances, Congress specified how the EPA should regulate pollution. This
type of statutory detail restricts what Shapiro and Glicksman call legislative
discretion. 95 For instance, in the 1984 RCRA Amendments, Congress gave the EPA
some discretion in classifying certain substances as hazardous. But, once the agency
classifies a substance as hazardous, it must require tanks used to
store the substance to
96
obtain approved leak detection and other protective systems.
More commonly in pollution control statutes, when Congress restricts legislative
discretion it also restricts regulatory discretion. 97 For instance, the 1984 RCRA
amendments banned outright the disposal of bulk or noncontainerized liquid hazardous
wastes in any landfill. 98 This approach leaves virtually no discretion for the agency
outside of enforcement. Congress was exceedingly specific on what the regulations
regarding disposal of containerized liquid hazardous wastes in landfills should state:
"Such regulations shall also prohibit the disposal in landfills of liquids that have been
absorbed in materials that biodegrade or that release liquids when compressed as might
occur during routine landfill operations." 99 In these 1984 RCRA Amendments,
Congress went so far as to set out design standards for hazardous waste landfills.
In contrast to modem pollution control statutes, the federal land management laws
have historically clustered around the agency latitude pole. This is best exemplified by
the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960,100 which instructs the Forest Service to
manage its lands sustainably for a number of uses without providing any binding
substantive standards. In interpreting the statute, the Ninth Circuit famously stated that
the Act's provisions "breathe discretion at every pore."' 01 Accompanying the scant
statutory detail is a tradition of particularly deferential judicial review. 10 2 Other
resource management statutes, such as the National Environmental Policy Act, also
grant a great deal of latitude to agencies.I°3
However, the statutory detail-agency latitude distinction grows ever less congruent
with the pollution control-resource management divide. Many modem public land
statutes reflect a trend in statutory detail similar to pollution control laws. As I have
shown elsewhere, there exists a distinct recent trend for Congress to specify
management tasks for newly established units of the National Park System. 104 In its
simplest form, establishment legislation would specify the metes and bounds of an area
to be reserved or acquired for management by the Park Service under the Organic
Act. 105 However, during the past twenty-five years, Congress has rarely limited its

95. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 91, at 822.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o)(4)(A); see also Shaprio & Glicksman, supra note 91, at 837 n.86

(discussing the practical application of the U.S. Code provisions).
97. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 91, at 837.

98. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(c)(1) (2000).
99. Id. § 6924(c)(2).
100. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (2000).
101. Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467,469 (9th Cir. 1975); see also 3 GEORGE C. COGGINS
& ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 16.5 (2007).
102. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1(1965); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506
(1910).

103. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
104. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail,supra note 9.
105. The establishment legislation for Haleakal5 National Park illustrates this bare-bones
approach. 16 U.S.C. § 396(b)-(c) (2000).
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lawmaking to simple area designation in establishment legislation. Congress
increasingly tailors management instructions for each unit established. Congress
specifies management constraints on park administration with respect to visitor
activities such as fishing, hunting, or grazing.1 06 It also sets out particular processes for
and, it requires the management
planning, involving public hearings and consultations;
07
issues.'
certain
address
to
themselves
plans
Like the 1984 RCRA amendments, establishment statutes increasingly employ
deadlines to constrain resource management agency discretion.' 08 The use of deadlines
in establishment legislation was unusual before 1980. But today Congress commonly
sets time limits on public land managers to publish mandated studies and management
plans.
Just as Congress has restricted the EPA's regulatory discretion by specifying what
substances will be subject to restrictions, so too it has restricted the Park Service's
discretion by specifying what uses studies and plans will address. Commentators
frequently call for more research on the condition of park resources and the effects of
visitors and environmental stressors on the National Park System.10 9 Chronically tight
budgets make the congressionally mandated studies the top funding priorities.
Common subjects specified in establishment legislation for study are suitability of
110
potential wilderness designations,"' l
lands for inclusion in a park unit,
1 3
transportation,112 and park resources.

In the absence of this statutory detail, the Park

106. The establishment legislation for Great Basin National Park, for instance, discusses
zoning waters for fishing and limiting grazing. 16 U.S.C. §§ 410mm(a), 410mm-l(a)-(e)
(2000).

107. The establishment legislation for Channel Islands National Park, for instance, provides
a deadline for a management plan, requires consultation with certain interested parties,
mandates certain contents of the plan, requires public hearings in particular locations to discuss
certain issues, specifies low-intensity and limited entry management, prohibits entry fees, and
mandates certain studies. 16 U.S.C. § 410ff (2000).
108. Nat'l Park Serv., Management Policies 2:6 (1988) ("[C]ongressionally directed plans
will be given a priority.").
109. See NAT'L PARKS AND CONSERVATION ASS'N, NATIONAL PARKS: FROM VIGNETrES TO A
GLOBAL VIEW 6-8 (1989) (calling for broad-based, ongoing research by the NPS.); NAT'L PARK
SERV. STEERING COMM., NATIONAL PARKS FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY: THE VAIL AGENDA 36 (1993)
("The National Park Service must engage in a sustained and integrated program of natural,
cultural, and social science resource management and research aimed at acquiring and using the
information needed to manage and protect park resources."); Dennis J. Herman, Note, Loving
Them to Death: Legal Controlson the Type and Scale ofDevelopment in the NationalParks, 11
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6-11 (1992); Nat'l Parks and Conservation Ass'n, Parks in the Next
Century, NAT'L PARKS, Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 18 (calling for "a threefold increase in natural,
cultural, and social science research staff').
110. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 228b(c) (2000) (Grand Canyon National Monument).
111. See 16 U.S.C. § 160f(b) (2000) (Voyageurs National Park); id. § 410ff-5 (Channel
Islands National Park); id. § 410gg (Biscayne National Park); id. § 410aaa (Death Valley
National Park); id. § 431 (note) (Congaree Swamp National Monument).
112. See 16 U.S.C. § 160j (2000) (discussing roads in the Voyageurs National Park); id. §
228g (discussing solutions for dealing with the dangerous or detrimental use of aircrafts around
the Grand Canyon National Park); id. § 271c (discussing construction of roads in the
Canyonlands National Park); id. § 272c (discussing use of driveways around Arches National
Park).
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Service would have greater discretion for setting its research priorities systemically. In
many cases, the subjects mandated by Congress reflect key issues that the Park Service
would be remiss in neglecting, such as the study of rock art in the Petroglyph National
Monument or erosion and sedimentation in Redwood National Park. However,
Congress does mandate action on other subjects that might not warrant a great deal of
attention from the standpoint of system management in an era of fiscal austerity. One
example is the 1988 mandate in amendments to the Olympic National Park
establishment legislation to study the location, size, and costs of a year-round visitor
1 14
center in the Kalaloch area.
In organic legislation, a similar trend toward statutory detail belies the notion that
Congress reserves its legislative drafting energies for pollution control. Organic
legislation establishes comprehensive management guidance for public land systems,
such as the National Forest System, the National Wildlife Refuge System, and the
National Wilderness Preservation System. Modem organic legislation now is
distinguished by statutory detail that falls into five basic categories that now serve as
hallmarks for legislation deserving the title "organic act." They are: purpose
statements, designated uses, comprehensive planning, substantive management criteria,
and public participation.' 15
For example, the fourth hallmark, substantive management criteria, provides
standards against which agency decisions can be measured. The rise in statutory detail
in this area has constrained agency discretion in public land management and invited
citizens and courts to intervene in agency priorities. The most recent organic statute,
the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997,116 binds the Fish and
Wildlife Service to implement a complex, five-level hierarchy of categorical
preferences for uses of the Refuge System. It also has substantive management
mandates to ensure the maintenance of "biological integrity, diversity, and
environmental health,"'1 17 acquire water rights needed for refuge purposes, 1 8 and
"monitor the status and trends of fish, wildlife, and plants in each refuge." 119
Though the reasons for statutory detail are different for RCRA, national park
establishment legislation, and public land organic legislation, their affinities are
important because they present similar problems for agencies and law reformers. In an
era of perennial austerity for agencies, there are often few resources remaining after
addressing legislative mandates. Statutory detail tends to freeze agency priorities and
make it difficult for agencies to respond to new developments. In particular, statutory

113. See 16 U.S.C. § 79k (2000) (discussing erosion and sedimentation in reference to the
pending Redwood National Park); id. § 273(b) (discussing the effects of grazing in the Capitol
Reef National Park); id. § 410ff-2 (discussing depletion of natural resources in the Channel
Islands National Park); id. § 431 (note) (discussing rock art at the Petroglyph National
Monument).
114. Washington Park Wilderness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-668, 102 Stat. 3961
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 251).
115. Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the HallmarksofModern
OrganicLegislation, 29 ECOLoGY L.Q. 457 (2002).
116. National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd--ee
(2000).
117. Id. § 5(a)(4)(B).

118. Id. § 5(a)(4)(G).
119. Id. § 5(a)(4)(N).
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detail hinders cross-cutting agency initiatives, such as Project XL in the EPA, 120 or the
Vail Agenda 21 in the NPS. When Congress micro-manages individual media- or
place-based programs, it thwarts administrative experiments that cut across media or
places. This is a particularly difficult hurdle for the implementation of adaptive
management, which most commentators regard as a requirement of ecosystem
management. Ecosystem management must draw heavily on scientific principles and
research so that management "can be designed and adjusted to minimize disruption of
natural processes."' 22 In other words, agencies must be flexible.
On the other hand, statutory detail can provide good political cover for agency
officials too weak to make good decisions on their own. The RCRA hammer
23
provisions strengthened the EPA's ability to support stringent treatment standards.1
The commands of establishment legislation forced the Park Service's hand to make the
controversial decision to allow hunting and trapping in a national historical park and
preserve.' 24 Substantive management criteria have restricted commodity development
in public lands. As a representative democratic institution, Congress has greater
legitimacy in setting priorities and specifying environmental
practices than agencies,
25
except where they concern pure questions of science.'
Dividing environmental law along the statutory detail versus agency latitude
distinction helps clarify these broad consequences and separate them from the
particular causes of the congressional micro-management. It also shows how the
original divide in legislative styles between pollution control and resource management
law has narrowed in recent years. From the information policy perspective, greater
statutory detail often worsens data gaps for agencies that may not proceed with actions
until fulfilling statutory criteria. On the other hand, certain kinds of details such as
hammer provisions, may shift information burdens to alleviate data gaps for an agency.

120. See generally Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the
EmperorHave Any Clothes?, 26 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,527 (1996); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing
EnvironmentalRegulation: The DangerousJourneyfrom Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV.
ENvTL. L. REv. 103 (1998); Lawrence E. Susskind &Joshua Secunda, "Improving"ProjectXL:
Helping Adaptive Management to Work Within EPA, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 155

(1998); Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, The Risks and the Advantages ofAgency
Discretion:Evidencefrom EPA's ProjectXL, 17 UCLA ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 67 (1998).
121. The Vail Agenda was a Park Service self-evaluation on the occasion of its 75th
anniversary. The Agenda cited "new, costly, and sometimes ill-conceived responsibilities" that
thwart the Service's ability to set funding priorities. NAT'L PARK SERV. STEERING COMM.,
36 (1993).
122. Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem
Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 293, 302 (1994).
NATIONAL PARKS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE VAIL AGENDA

123. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (2000).
124. Jean Lafitte National Historical Park, Pub. L. No. 95-625, 92 Stat. 3536 (1978)

(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 230).
125. But see Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) (noting that the President, who controls agency
appointees, is elected to serve the national interest, not parochial legislative districts); Richard
B. Stewart, Beyond DelegationDoctrine,36 AM. U. L. REv. 323, 332 (1987) (commenting that
statutory details are created in "a submerged micropolitical process without open and regular
procedures").
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2. Commerce Clause vs. Property Clause
Because federal statutes dominate the environmental law scene, the enumerated
powers the Constitution granted to Congress can highlight legal differences between
programs. Though the spending and treaty powers support some environmental
legislation, most statutes rely on either the Commerce Clause or the Property Clause.
The Commerce Clause first affiliated with environmental concerns through the
regulation of navigable waters. Indeed, the Clean Water Act continues to employ the
term "navigable waters," even while it defines its scope in broader terms.1 26 The
modem era of environmental law builds on the New Deal expansion in the range of the
Commerce Clause. 127 All of the pollution control statutes rely on the Commerce
Clause for their constitutionality.
The lesser-known Property Clause authorizes Congress to make "all needful rules
and regulations respecting... property belonging to the United States." 28 This is the
basis for all of the federal public land laws. However, some resource management
statutes, such as the ESA and SMCRA, rely on the Commerce Clause. Still other
resource management statutes, such as NEPA, are most squarely authorized by the
Necessary and Proper Clause of Article 1.129
As the Supreme Court narrows the breadth of Congressional power under the
Commerce Clause, the resource management programs relying on that clause become
especially vulnerable. Because the ESA and section 404 of the CWA, for instance,
focus on the target resource to be protected (species and wetlands) and not traditional
economic activity regulation (in contrast to, say, the NPDES permit program), they are
particularly close to the Court's chopping block. This was evident in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng'rs, where the Court
interpreted the Clean Water Act to exclude isolated wetlands from federal
protection. 130 The Court justified this narrow reading of the CWA on the constitutional
questions that would be raised by including non-navigable, non-adjacent wetlands in a
Commerce Clause statute. Thus far, Commerce Clause challenges to the validity of the
ESA have failed, but by narrow margins. 131 The vulnerability of these two
environmental law programs illustrates the uneasy fit between resource management or

126. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), (5) (establishing statutory goals to eliminate the
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters), and 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (defming "discharge of
a pollutant" to mean the addition of any pollutant to "navigable waters"), with 33 U.S.C. §
1362(7) (defining "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States").
127. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
128. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress "Without
Limitation ": The Property Clause and FederalRegulation of PrivateProperty, 86 MFNN. L.

REv. 1 (2001) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the Property Clause).
129. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
130. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). More recently, the Court divided over the question of whether the
CWA regulates wetlands without continuous surface connections to navigable waters. Rapanos
v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006). Questions remain about whether the Court's limited
reading of statutory jurisdiction inthese wetland cases applies to the NPDES program. Robin K.
Craig, Which Way Federalism Under Section 402?, 22 Natural Resources and Environment,
Summer 2007, at 20.
131. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v.

Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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place-based statutes and the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause "fit" is much
closer for pollution control or activity-based statutes.
One solution to this problem is to justify more resource management and placebased statutes on the Property Clause. For federally owned resources (such as those
governed by the 1872 General Mining Law) or places (such as the national forests),
Congress already does this. For resources not owned by the federal government, this
approach raises interesting constitutional issues. Where Congress can relate the target
of protection or management to federal property, as it did in the Wild Free-Roaming
Horses and Burros Act, 132 the Court has upheld the statute.' 33 However, the connection
between the quality of federally owned ecosystems and some isolated wetlands or
endangered species might be too attenuated to support a Property Clause justification.
Though the leading Court cases on the extent of the Property Clause are extremely
permissive and broad,134 they predate the recent trend of the Court to limit
congressional power. 35 A court that is cutting back on the extent of Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause may be equally assertive about retracting the Property
Clause platform. Nonetheless, there is no analogously stringent "substantially affects"
or "economic enterprise" tests, 136 which attach to review of Commerce Clause
programs, for Congress' exercise of the Property Clause. And, there is a much stronger
tradition 7of favoring national over state and local authority in interpreting the Property
3
Clause. 1

The constitutional clause supporting an environmental law statute does not dictate
the information policies and problems that manifest in implementation. But, the
constitutional divide will grow more important if the Supreme Court tightens its limits
on Commerce Clause authority. To maintain current programs, Congress would have
either to provide the information establishing the significant connections that the Court
demands under the Commerce Clause or tie environmental concerns to federal
properties.
D. Conclusion

Scholars and practitioners most frequently divide environmental law into its subject
matter categories. But other differences are important in understanding how
information policy plays out. Regulatory approaches and statutory attributes may have
an even more powerful influence on the information demands of law and the resulting
data gaps between science and implementation. The next Part illustrates a particularly
intractable information problem in the Endangered Species Act that does not

132. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000).
133. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540-47 (1976).

134. Id. at 540; see also United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19,40 (1947) (explaining that
the Court will not assume that Congress will use its power over federal property to cause
injustice to the states).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
136. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, at 559-60.
137. John D. Leshy, A Property Clausefor the Twenty-first Century, 75 U. COLO. L. REv.
1101, 1101 (2004); see, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973)

(holding that a federal conservation easement preempts hostile state law).
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comfortably fit within any of the established categories. A close look at the problem
also invites an exploration of the role that the judiciary plays in mediating data gaps.
II. A DATA GAP ACROSS THE DIVIDE: THE ESA HARM PROHIBITION
As a statute dealing with biological resources, the ESA is often grouped with the
public land and extraction laws. 138 The duty that the ESA imposes on federal agencies
to engage in a consultative analysis to avoid authorizing actions that jeopardize the
continued existence of a listed threatened or endangered species shares a strong
affinity with the National Historic Preservation Act, 139 the National Environmental
Policy Act,140 and other non-regulatory statutes. However, the hotly contested ground
of ESA regulation of private activities, especially land use, belongs with the
categorical mandates of pollution control law, authorized by the Commerce Clause.
Particularly in the past fifteen years, with the rise of the ESA incidental take permit
program, this hybrid statute shares many attributes of the statutes that the EPA
implements. 141 More than any other single law, the ESA challenges the conventional
divisions of environmental law.
This Part looks at one particularly vexing ESA problem: the data gap between what
science provides and what courts demand in resolving cases dealing with the harm
prohibition. Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the "take" of any endangered species. 142
"Take" in the ESA means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."' 143 Because the
element of harm (along with harass) is the most broad in this "take-out" menu, it has
been the subject of much litigation, regulation, and controversy. InSweetHome,144 the
Supreme Court upheld the regulatory definition of harm that includes "significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or
sheltering."' 145 But lower courts struggle with the application of the definition in
uncertain circumstances. 146
138. See, e.g., GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES
LAW 271-328 (6th ed. 2007). See Fischman, What Is NaturalResourcesLaw?, supra note 9, at
725.
139. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470w-6.
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f
141. See Fischman, What Is NaturalResources Law?, supra note 9, at 725, 727.

142. Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 § 9(A)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)
(2000). For a discussion of data gaps and the ESA administrative programs, especially listing,
see Kristin Carden, Bridging the Divide: The Role of Science in Species ConservationLaw, 30
HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 165 (2006); Holly Doremus, The Purposes,Effects, and Future of the
EndangeredSpecies Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004); Holly
Doremus, Listing decisions underthe EndangeredSpecies Act: Why Better Science Isn't Always
Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (1997).
143. Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 § 3(14), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000).

144. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696-703
(1995).
145. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006).
146. See, e.g., Michael J. Bean, The Endangered Species Act and Private Land: Four

Lessons Learnedfrom the Past QuarterCentury, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,701 (1988) (reviewing
lower court decisions); Steven G. Davidson, The Aftermath of Sweet Home Chapter:
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A. Courts and Modern Ecology
Courts are institutions that arose from the foundation of what has been described as
the "Newtonian" structure of the U.S. Constitution. 147 They operate in a mechanical
universe that recognizes direct, linear causes and effects. In assigning liability, courts
have traditionally, and correctly, safeguarded a defendant from responsibility for
actions that are not directly attributable to his behavior. Even as they increasingly
apply statutes in resolving disputes, courts hew to their customary reluctance to assign
fault without proximate causation.
If Einstein was correct that God does not play dice with the universe, 14 then an
understanding of modem ecology recruits the divine spirit for some other game of
chance. One of the deep, defining characteristics of the current ecological paradigm is
that nature operates stochastically. 149 The linear, deterministic models of cause and
effect in common law fail to describe the behavior of natural systems. As with dice,
roulette, or any other game of chance, the best we can do about predicting outcomes or
explaining occurrences is to describe relative likelihoods. Stochastic systems may
behave predictably in aggregate, but defy identification of direct cause-effect for their
components. They are complex, disorderly, and erratic.
Common law is based on judicial principles, and derives its authority from custom
and usage rather than statute. Tort law is primarily concerned with remedying past
harms, and may grant compensation, restitution, and punitive awards for violations of
the duty of care. 150 Damage awards modify future behavior indirectly by providing
disincentives for future conduct that is unduly risky. 151
The common law framework
also includes proximate causation, which courts employ to prevent unfairness in
attaching liability, and a "preponderance of the evidence' 152 standard of proof.
Usually, Congress assigns ecological issues to agencies for implementation. For
example, the National Forest Management Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to

Modification of Wildlife Habitatas a ProhibitedTaking in Violation of the EndangeredSpecies
Act, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &POL'Y REv. 541 (2003); Steven P. Quarles, John A. MacLeod
& Thomas R. Lundquist, Sweet Home and the Narrowingof Wildlife "Take" Under Section 9
of the EndangeredSpecies Act, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,003 (1996); Ray Vaughan, Proofof
"ProhibitedTakings" Under the EndangeredSpecies Act, in 27 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 421
(3d ed. 1994).
147. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvatureof ConstitutionalSpace: What Lawyers Can Learn
from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1989).
148. RONALD W. CLARK, EINSTEIN: THE LIFE AND TIMES (1972).
149. The stochastic, non-equilibrium paradigm is explained by DANIEL B. BOTKIN,
DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990); DONALD
WORSTER, NATURE'S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS 388-420 (2d ed. 1994); A.
Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of
EnvironmentalLaw, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1121, 1123 (1994).
150. Compensation is payment of damages or any other act that a court orders to be done by
a party who injures another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 301 (8th ed. 2004). Restitution is
disgorgement of benefit wrongly taken. Id. at 1309.
151. Courts may also provide injunctions as equitable relief for claims of potential future
harm.
152. The preponderance of the evidence standard is equivalent to the more likely than not
standard, and reflects a burden of fifty-one percent.
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prepare comprehensive plans that provide for biodiversity. 53 Then, courts know how
to handle resulting disputes: defer to the agency's plausible interpretation. 51 4 But,
citizen suit provisions, such as section 11 (g) of the ESA,1 55 may present an ecological
dispute to the courts without the benefit of an expert agency determination. Without a
deference principle on which to rely, courts must make their own determinations,
linking available evidence with legal standards. In such cases, the common law
concept of proximate causation fails to jibe with the way nature works. As a result,
courts face a dilemma: either apply a legal doctrine that does not
recognize/comprehend the mechanisms that lead to an alleged harm, or improvise the
basis for a decision using the underlying statute in a way that does not conform with
common law notions of causation, or precedent.
By far the most common and important situation in which courts face this dilemma
is under section 9 of the Endangered Species Act. 156 The history of take prohibitions,
the language used in the Department of the Interior's regulations for section 9, and the
U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Sweet Home all suggest that section 9 be applied using
a common law framework. 157 Most commentators and courts agree that, at least when
filling in the gaps in the statutory scheme, courts should borrow from the common
law.15 8 Whether it is the best choice or not, common law principles, especially
proximate cause, are the default goveming principles for judicial resolution of disputes
over section 9.159
B. The Harm Problem
To understand the problem of harm in the ESA, it is important to understand the
reasons why species decline to the point of endangerment. Just as "every unhappy
family is unhappy in its own way,"' 60 every species on the list, has its own woeful tale
to tell. But, it is possible to generalize five different forces driving anthropogenic
extinction. These are what E.O. Wilson and David Wilcove call the mindless horsemen
of the environmental apocalypse: over-harvest, habitat alteration, invasive species,
disease vectors, and pollution.' 16 Of these culprits, habitat alteration, sometimes

153. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2000).
154. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 619 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that plaintiffs face a
"high bar" when challenging the Forest Service).
155. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
156. Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000).
157. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 718
(1995) (explaining that it is obvious that the meaning of the word "take" is "deeply embedded"
in the common law).
158. See, e.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997); Paul Boudreaux,
Understanding "Take" in the Endangered Species Act, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 734 (2002)

(explaining that the take provision of the ESA should not be read "in isolation from" the
common law); Quarles et al., supranote 146, at 10003; James R. Rasband, Priority,Probability,
andProximate Cause Lessons from Tort Law About Imposing ESA Responsibilityfor Wildlife
Harm on Water Users and Other JointHabitatModifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595 (2003).
159. 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
160. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA I (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans.,
Penguin Books 2003) (1873).
161. DAVID S. WILCOvE, THE CONDOR'S SHADOW 8 (1999); EDWARD 0. WtLSON, THE
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obliteration, is the most important. It is a factor in the decline of eighty-five percent of
listed species. 162
How to reverse habitat degradation causing extinctions is the single most difficult
challenge to the ESA. The problem of habitat degradation is particularly vexing
because its agents are generally diffused over a wide area. There may be no single
actor creating a significant problem. Rather, many people engaging in small,
incremental habitat modifications cumulate into a problem for species viability. Also,
most land use is a local matter not otherwise under the control of federal power or the
ESA. Unless a federal permit, contract, or grant is involved, the ESA does not directly
regulate the land disturbing activity. Finally, the adverse effects of habitat modification
on individual animals may not be immediately visible. The link between habitat
modification and species decline might not be understood until well after the harm has
been done. Like all harm-based (utilitarian) approaches in environmental law, ESA
take determinations demand a great deal of information, generally much more than is
convincingly supplied by scientific data. 163
Private land logging illustrates these frustrating attributes and is a frequent activity
challenged in section 9 litigation. Consider the facts from ForestConservationCouncil
v. Rosboro Lumber Co., a key Ninth Circuit decision that established an important test
for injunctive relief under section 9.164 The lumber company intended to log trees on a
privately owned, forty-acre site adjacent to nesting habitat of the threatened northern
spotted owl. An environmental group sued Rosboro, seeking to enjoin the timber
harvest.
Three difficult features of this case characterize many of the take cases and open
gaps between science and the law. The first thing to notice about these facts is that
nobody alleged that a take occurred. Rather, the environmental group sought to prevent
a take from occurring in the future. Therefore, the court had to consider evidence
predictive of the effects of logging on nesting owls. Second, any harm to the owl
would be incidental to some other lawful activity. Nobody accused the lumber
company of intending to injure owls. The felling of trees itself would not be a cause of
injury. No occupied or nest trees would be harvested. From a moral and causative
perspective, any harm to owls is incidental and indirect. It is the change in the habitat
from old-growth forest to clear-cut, and ultimately young, even-aged forest that raises
the risk that an owl will be injured through impairment of an essential behavior. The
clear-cutting of the timber stand near a nest might make feeding more difficult by
eliminating habitat for the owl's prey, or it might deprive the owl of shelter during
feeding, making the owl more vulnerable to its predators. This kind of disturbance of
the owl's preferred habitat happens all the time in nature. Where there is an abundance
of old-growth habitat, a forty-acre clear-cut adjacent to a nest would likely have little
effect on the owls' behavior. However, the owls are on the verge of extinction
precisely because so much old-growth forest has been eaten away by forty-acre clearcuts. This leads to the third key observation: habitat alteration today may constitute a
take because species have nowhere else to go. An activity that would have been
perfectly benign three decades ago today might injure an animal.
DIVERsITY OF LIFE 253 (1992).
162. WILCOVE, supra note 161, at 8.

163. On harm in environmental law, see generally Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role ofHarm
in EnvironmentalLaw, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 897 (2006).
164. 50 F.3d 781, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1995).
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The kind of evidence relevant to the court's determination included not only
information about the particular pair of owls nesting adjacent to the logging site, but
also studies of owl behavior generally, especially owl responses to nearby logging. The
northern spotted owl is an unusual listed species because it has received so much
scientific attention. More typically, for a species such as a sea turtle, a mouse, or a
snake, it is exceedingly difficult
for a plaintiff to proffer more than just the educated
1 65
judgment of scientific experts.'
The Rosboro court applied the common law ofproximate cause to this problem and
arrived at the most common formulation for determining when to issue an injunction
under section 9. According to the Rosboro test, a court may enjoin an activity that
poses a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm. The court chose the relatively
stringent "reasonably certain" language because the harm regulation demands that the
habitat modification "actually" kill or injure wildlife. 166 The appeals court remanded
the case for the district court to determine whether the evidence met the proximate
cause standard. 167 The next year, in MarbledMurrelet v. Babbitt, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the continued vitality of the Rosboro test against a challenge that it failed to
accord with Sweet Home.168 Marbled Murrelet upheld findings that evidence of
observed birds in the area, combined with more general ecological observations about
the effects of certain kinds of logging on the species, met the injunctive standard that
the logging posed a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm through impairment of
breeding.
C. Proximate Cause
Common law proximate cause refers to reasonably anticipated consequences or the
lack of intervening forces between the challenged activity and harm. 169 The best
argument for applying the proximate cause limit to section 9 cases is that it is not fair
to hold actors responsible for every effect that could be causally linked to their conduct
regardless of how remote, unusual, or unforeseeable the consequence.' 70 Sweet Home
clearly meant to provide some constraints on the potentially expansive reach of section
9 liability. The court's holding is based, in part, on the emphasis in the harm regulation
on the word "actually." However, another powerful argument recommending
proximate cause is that, as a common law concept, it is well tested by far more cases
than will ever be brought under the ESA.
Nonetheless, there are perils for courts employing common law proximate cause
because the concept is never precisely defined. 171 And it is notoriously unreliable when
dealing with risk. 172 A doctrine invented to limit liability in situations not involving

165. See, e.g., United States v. W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd. P'ship, No. Civ. 96-1575-HO,
2000 WL 298707 (D. Or. 2000).

166. 50 C.F.R. 17.3 (2006).
167. Rosboro, 50 F.3d 781.
168. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996).
169. DAN B. DOBBS, 1THE LAW OF TORTS 443 (2001).
170. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713
(1995).
171. See Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the
PresentDarkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 51-52 (1991) (citing two prominent treatises giving
conflicting definitions of proximate cause).
172. See Nancy Levit, EtherealTorts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 136, 155 n. 104 (1992) (giving
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such complex interactions as occur in ecosystems may not serve well the interests of
justice in take litigation. Moreover, the ESA's statutory purpose demands a standard of
proof more protective of species. Professor Lin suggests a standard of liability "defined
in terms of whether a person's conduct was-or is likely to be-a substantial factor in
harm to a species."' 73 Courts have modified the traditional proximate cause standard in
Superfund cases in order to fulfill 75the purposes of that statute. 174 Some form of
proportionate liability might result. 1
But, a court must decide the cases presented to it with the tools available. For most
judges that means adapting proximate cause to decide whether a prospective harm
allegation deserves an injunctive remedy. Is the Rosboro standard the best adaptation
of proximate cause? Professor Paul Boudreaux argues that the Ninth Circuit's
"reasonably certain" standard is a relatively strict standard of proof, and that in section
9 cases the courts should instead use the traditional tort law preponderance of the
evidence criterion. 176 While that may recalibrate the test to protect more wildlife, it
nonetheless suffers from the same infirmity as the Rosboro standard: it is onedimensional. The concentration on a single standard ofproof from tort law is indicative
of the limitations of the common law approach. A test that better matches the kind of
information science provides would include a confidence interval. In addition to the
probability of harm, courts also need to grapple with the confidence, or uncertainty, of
the probability estimate. Most courts fail to distinguish between these two concepts in
take litigation. But those courts could learn from the deeper exploration that courts
reviewing public health risks under administrative
law have undertaken to reconcile
177
the statutory triggers with statistical realities.
A large sample size, numerous studies, and small variations among multiple studies
are examples of factors that would increase the confidence of an estimate of the
probability of harm as a result of a proposed activity. Alas, information available on
most endangered species is generally based on only a few observations. Confidence is
generally low for predicting harm. As Professor Craig Pease has observed, the
regulation's preoccupation with "actual harm" often translates into a need for plaintiffs

examples of confusion between proximate cause and probability inthe medical context); W. Kip
Viscusi, Jurors,Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107,
111-12 (2001) (explaining that high-cost, low-probability events create trouble for decision
making); Richard W. Wright, Causation,Responsibility,Risk Probability,Naked Statistics,and
Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1001, 1002

(1988) (explaining that confusion exists between the concepts of responsibility, risk, and
responsibility).
173. Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretationof EnvironmentalLaw in the Supreme Court's

2003-04 Term, 42 Hous. L. REv. 565, 617 (2005).
174. 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL
SUBSTANCES

LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND

§ 8.11 (1992); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Improving Laws, Declining World: The

Tort of Contamination,38 VAL. U. L. REv. 1249, 1259 (2004).
175. Rasband, supranote 158, at 630-37 (advocating a form of proportionate liability in take
cases in the environmental context); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass
Exposure Cases:A "PublicLaw" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849, 866 (1984)
(explaining that proportionality is ideally suited to resolving problems of causal indeterminacy).
176. Boudreaux, supra note 158, at 770.
177. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (Vinyl Chloride), 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
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to demonstrate imminent harm to "an identifiable animal."' 7 8 This can be an
impossible burden to meet. It also demands a probability estimate that likely is quite
uncertain. Some of this uncertainty arises from the dearth of information generated by
scientists. But even for the northern spotted owl, a species subject to much scientific
study, uncertainty remains from the stubborn indeterminacy of complex natural
systems. 179 A few courts have introduced an additional showing that gestures toward
the confidence level of a predicted likelihood of harm. For example, in Defenders of
Wildlife v. Bernalthe court reiterated the "reasonably certain" standard, 80 but added
that plaintiffs "had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
proposed construction would harm a pygmy-owl by killing or injuring it, or would
more likely than not harass a pygmy-owl by annoying it to such an extent as to disrupt
its normal behavioral patterns."'' 1 Similarly, in West Coast Forest Resources, the
district court repeated the MarbledMurrelet standard but added that the plaintiff must
also prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that this interference will "actually kill
182
or injure the owls.',
Courts seldom engage in a focused discussion of risk. In West Coast, the district
court rejected as too speculative a hypothesis of plaintiff's expert that the logging
could harm the owls indirectly by increasing their energy expenditure in foraging. 183 In
Greenpeace Found. v. Mineta, plaintiffs claimed that the lobster fishery adversely
modified the habitat of monk seals by depleting the lobster population upon which the
seals preyed. 184 The Greenpeacecourt's requirement that lobster be "absolutely critical
to the diet of the monk seal"' 85 indicates that the level of risk necessary to prove a
"take" (i.e., the threshold probability of harm) was relatively high. 186 Sometimes in
establishing a high risk threshold, however, courts go even further, for instance in
requiring the harm to individuals to rise to the level
ofjeopardy to the existence of the
88
species,187 or retarding recovery of the species.'

178. Craig M. Pease, Viewpoint: In Defense off > 1, 55 BIOSCIENCE 100 (2005) (quoting
United States v. W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd. P'ship, No. Civ. 96-1575-HO, 2000 WL 298707, at
*5 (D. Or. 2000) (denying the plaintiff federal agency an injunction against a clear-cut for
failure to demonstrate with reasonable certainty that the timber harvest would result in a take of
a northern spotted owl)).
179. Joel A. Tickner, The Role ofEnvironmentalScience in PrecautionaryDecisionMaking,
in

PRECAUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, AND PREVENTIVE PUBLIC POLICY

3, 4-5 (Joel A.

Tickner ed., 2003).
180. 204 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2000).
181. Id.
182. W.Coast ForestRes. Ltd. P'ship,2000 WL 298707, at *5.
183. Id.
184. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127 (D. Haw. 2000).
185. Id. at 1134.
186. The strength of the seal's dependence on lobster as a food source would be a parameter
in a model used to estimate risk.
187. Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424,432 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
188. W. CoastForestRes. Ltd. P'ship,2000 WL 298707, at *5(quoting Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n
v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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D. The Data Gapsfor Harm: Easing the Burdenfor Courts

Should the judiciary reinterpret the common law concept of proximate cause in
harm cases to fit the information science provides? The ESA is silent on this question.
But the structure of the ESA (one of the elements the Court used to support the harm
regulation in Sweet Home) provides a basis for relaxing somewhat the common law
grip on take cases. Understanding the structural argument requires rethinking the
ESA's place in the subject matter divide and instead seeing its regulatory attributes.
Courts and commentators should remove their natural resources law blinders. Even
though the ESA concerns nature protection, the solution to the section 9 puzzle comes
from EPA-administered pollution control law.
Most courts view the take prohibition as a strict ban on an activity and are quite
concerned about the severe consequences on a defendant of finding a take. However,
habitat owners seeking to proceed with a harm-causing activity have an attractive
alternative: apply for an incidental take permit. Section 9 serves as a gatekeeper for
incidental take permits. Indeed, the piecemeal nature of habitat fragmentation means
that some coordination in the geographic range of a listed species is needed for
recovery. Incidental take permits can help promote this through both mitigation
programs as well as multi-party plans.
This interpretive gloss on the functional meaning of the take prohibition comes
from pollution control law, where similarly draconian provisions operate to condition
rather than prohibit economic activities. The ESA section 10 permit program ought to
be viewed in the same light. Viewing the take prohibition as a trigger rather than a
permitting laws and with a
draconian proscription is more consistent with pollution
89
somewhat more relaxed approach to proximate cause.'
Section 9 does trace its roots to simple, strict prohibitions of take.' 90 And, until
1982, the ESA had no mechanism for allowing takes. However, today the principal use
of section 9 is not to wipe the landscape clean of all actions that would harm species.
Instead, section 9 functions as a sorting mechanism to identify those activities that
require an incidental take permit before they may proceed. In this respect, section 9
operates much like section 301 of the Clean Water Act, which appears superficially to
be an outright prohibition on discharge of pollutants into water. 191 In practice, though,
CWA section 301 serves as a mechanism to force dischargers to the negotiating table
to acquire permits. Similarly, cases alleging harm are now ultimately about whether
defendants need to acquire permits or not. The determination of harm is a
determination about whether the permitting requirements, such as minimizing and
mitigating adverse effects on listed species, will apply. 192 Courts misconceive the ESA
when they view the harm determination as fundamentally about whether the activity
may precede at all. This either/or approach mirrors the unidimensional understanding
of risk that pervades most of the reported take cases. A multidimensional risk

189. See, e.g., Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 512-13 (10th Cir. 1985)
(refusing to overturn an agency determination that a reservoir project failed to qualify for
automatic approval despite attenuated causation).
190. Michael E. Field, The Evolution of the Wildlife Taking Conceptfrom Its Beginning to
Its Culmination in the EndangeredSpecies Act, 21 Hous. L. REv. 457, 459-64 (1984).
191. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995).
192. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (2000).
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assessment better matches the nature of the problem, the uncertainties of predicting
ecological effects, and the other environmental law programs with close affinities to
the ESA.
The analogy to pollution control law suggests not only this interpretive gloss for
courts. It also suggests a better way of framing the regulatory definition of harm. A
regulatory change simplifying the showing required to prove harm would reduce
litigation and induce more land disturbers to acquire incidental take permits.
One approach would bar any significant disturbance of habitat of any listed species
for which habitat is a contributing factor for its decline. The Services could, at listing
or shortly thereafter, indicate what extent of habitat disturbance is significant: some
measure of size and intensity.' 93 This would ameliorate both the difficulties of proof
and would bring the section 9 trigger for permitting more in line with other
environmental laws. However, it would encourage gaming the regulatory system. A
logger, for instance, faced with a threshold of harm set at a twenty-acre clear-cut might
choose a series of nineteen-acre timber harvests to come in just under the trigger. In
94
this respect, rules specifying the thresholds for take become road maps for evasion. 1
Another approach would use best management practices to condition harm-threatening
activities in order to minimize the significance of habitat disruption. However, even a
well-tailored description of best practices might be too coarsely grained to apply easily
to all of the potential sites and sizes of disturbance. Nonetheless, these pathways of
regulatory reform hold promise to ease the burden on the courts and advance the
purpose of the ESA. This is a circumstance where bridging the divides of
environmental law reveals a constructive recommendation for reform. In pollution
control, courts have long accepted the notion
that there is a difference between
95
statutory causation and tort proximate cause.
CONCLUSION

Though different kinds of environmental law may display different versions of
information policy problems, all divisions of the field manifest the data gaps between
what science supplies and environmental law demands. The harm problem in ESA
section 9 take litigation shows how the divides of environmental law can blind courts
and other institutions to alternative approaches for dealing with scientific information
(or the lack thereof). Viewing the ESA take prohibition as a natural resource topic
leads courts to limit injunctions to just those rare circumstances of fairly high certainty.
But, if one shifts perspectives and regards the ESA provision as a trigger for a
utilitarian, place-based permit program, the stakes for injunctive relief diminish. That

193. In fact, the Interior and Commerce Departments pledged to do something very close to
this in 1994, when they announced ajoint policy to provide greater certainty under section 9by
identifying at the time of listing activities that would or would not likely constitute a take.
Notice of Cooperative Policy for Endangered Species Act Section 9 Prohibitions, 59 Fed. Reg.
34,373-01 (July 1, 1994).
194. Cf Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the
Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 298 (1990) (discussing the similar
problems with detailed SEC rules).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252,264-65 (3d Cir. 1992);
Robert L. Glicksman, CERCLA ReauthorizationandNaturalResource Damage Recovery, 9 J.
NAT. RES. & ENvTL. L. 313, 318-19 (1993-94).
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could make the information burdens of proving harm more manageable. Bridging the
divide allows us to reconfigure key assumptions about how information in
environmental law operates. A broader, omnivorous view illustrates solutions to
similar difficulties that are at hand in other areas of environmental law.
The divides of environmental law are real enough. The characteristic differences
that separate subject matters, regulatory styles, and legal authorities do have important
ramifications for understanding and implementing law. But the reduction necessary to
make practical progress in advancing environmental programs should never obscure
the affinities across the divides that offer rich possibilities for law reform. One of those
important affinities is the persistent gap between the information science can provide
and what law demands. The similarities of this gap throughout environmental law
overwhelm the differences, which can obscure comprehensive reform. Environmental
law may work well in theory, but in practice the information problems overwhelm the
ability of agencies and courts to make the kind of progress envisioned by Congress and
the public.

